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ABSTRACT. Government resource decisions in the Arctic typically involve complex issues; multiple criteria are used to choose
among alternatives. This complexity is even greater with petroleum development because of concerns about national energy
security, environmental impacts, and economic development. Two decision-aiding techniques may help decision makers clarify
their decisions to themselves, the stakeholders, and the general public. The Russian qualitative technique seeks to reduce the
number of criteria and find alternative options that may be better than the initial ones. The Western quantitative technique seeks
to measure the decision maker’s judgement about the utility and certainty of each option. These techniques are applied to two case
studies: a decision about gas pipeline routing on the Yamal Peninsula, Russia, and a tool for evaluating applications for
development permits on the North Slope of Alaska. The qualitative method is easier to use and may be the best model for people
who use numbers infrequently or want to make a claim based on rights. The quantitative method did well at preserving detail and
incorporating uncertainty. Both approaches helped to reduce the apparent complexity of the decisions.
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RÉSUMÉ. Les décisions gouvernementales concernant les ressources dans l’Arctique mettent le plus souvent en jeu des questions
complexes; un grand nombre de critères sont utilisés en vue de choisir parmi différentes options. Cette complexité s’accroît dans
le cas de l’exploitation pétrolière en raison des problèmes entourant la sécurité nationale de l’énergie, les retombées environnementales
et le développement économique. Deux techniques d’aide à la décision peuvent inciter les décideurs à clarifier leurs décisions pour
eux-mêmes, pour les parties intéressées et pour le grand public. La technique qualitative russe cherche à réduire le nombre de
critères et à trouver des solutions de rechange qui pourraient être meilleures que les mesures initiales. La technique quantitative
occidentale cherche à mesurer le jugement du décideur sur l’utilité et la certitude de chaque option. Ces techniques sont appliquées
à deux études de cas: une décision concernant le tracé d’un gazoduc dans la presqu’île de Iamal en Russie, et un outil permettant
d’évaluer les demandes de permis d’exploitation sur le versant Nord de l’Alaska. La méthode qualitative est plus facile à utiliser
et peut être le meilleur modèle pour des individus qui n’ont pas l’habitude des chiffres ou qui veulent établir une revendication
fondée sur des droits. La méthode quantitative réussit bien à préserver le détail et à intégrer l’incertitude. Les deux approches
aidaient à réduire la complexité apparente des décisions.
Mots clés: pétrole et gaz, analyse des décisions, presqu’île Iamal, Badami, Niakuk
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INTRODUCTION
The world’s desire for oil and gas has led to the exploration
and development of fields in the remote corners of the earth.
The importance to developed economies of petroleum for
transportation, electrical generation, and temperature control
has made supervision of these resources matters of national
and international security. However, development has proved
controversial in areas where the natural environment is con-
sidered particularly valuable or vulnerable.
The development of petroleum fields in the Arctic is a case
in point. The world-class discovery of the Prudhoe Bay oil
field in Alaska should have been followed by immediate
development and operation. Instead, a nascent environmental
movement held up exploitation for several years. Only the
Arab oil boycott in 1974 convinced the United States Con-
gress to remove all environmental roadblocks and allow the
construction of the Trans-Alaska Pipeline System. In Russia,
the central government has decided to develop gas fields on
the Yamal Peninsula because of a national need for foreign
exchange. This decision was made despite an expert commis-
sion report that raised serious environmental and indigenous
rights concerns.
Whether to develop new fields in the Arctic, and under
what conditions, has become a national and international
issue. The terms of this debate involve complex concerns tied
up with multiple factors that must be taken into account. A
clear-cut answer rarely emerges even when “the national
interest” is considered paramount. A major difficulty derives
precisely from defining what the national interest is. This
complexity is true of many environmental debates, but be-
comes most obvious when, as in the Arctic, the issue pits
fundamental needs of the economy and society, such as
transportation, against fundamental symbols of environmen-
tal purity, such as the sparsely inhabited polar regions.
The Need for a Reviewable Rationale
The need for a reviewable rationale now exists in both
Russia and the United States. The need in the United States
has existed since at least the passage of the National Environ-
mental Policy Act (NEPA) in 1969. Alaska was the site of
perhaps the first environmental impact review, which pre-
dated NEPA by almost a decade (O’Neill, 1994). NEPA, as
well as several acts that have followed, requires a multi-
agency and public review of the environmental impacts of a
proposed federal action. Single agencies continue to make
decisions about those actions, but they must explain their
preference and fully answer objections put forth by other
agencies and the public.
In Russia, the situation is now similar. In Soviet times,
many Arctic problems were declared “secret” for military
reasons. Central ministries were the dominant decision mak-
ers. Now, the government must explain decisions about
Arctic resources to the general population and active groups.
The decisions must be well prepared, logical, and rational to
establish why the selected option is the best. The need to use
decision analysis is new for government administrators in
Russia, where the tradition of authoritarian rule is strong.
Every application of decision analysis has special value
under Russian conditions: the analysis must continually dem-
onstrate its usefulness to all participants in real decision-
making processes.
In the United States, despite a longer history of open
decision making, resource decisions in the Arctic still appear
to be ad hoc or politically motivated. In either case, a broadly
understandable, reviewable rationale is missing. The result
can be political and legal battles in which the facts and public
interest are buried beneath slogans and simplified images.
Clarification of a decision, therefore, can improve the deci-
sion-making process: the decision maker can show that the
decision was based on full consideration of the issues, and the
public and stakeholders can see where the key issues lie.
Because knowledge of the Arctic is generally lacking at the
national level in most nations, clarity can result in both better
decisions and a better-informed public.
The Structure of This Study
This paper considers how natural resource decisions,
particularly related to oil and gas development, can be
clarified, justified, or improved. The research had two prin-
cipal components.
One component was to review and evaluate available
methods for analyzing and guiding the decision-making
process. In this component, we compared a quantitative
approach familiar in the West with a Russian qualitative
approach. Each approach organizes the data, knowledge, and
value judgements the decision makers would normally use in
a structured, transparent way that clarifies the options, argu-
ments, and implied decision. Both approaches are intended to
enhance the perceptions of individual decision makers. They
are not attempts at objective analyses. Both methods, espe-
cially the quantitative one, have been widely used throughout
the world to make sounder public and other decisions and to
communicate their grounds and assumptions to interested
parties (Brown, 1987; Larichev et al., 1995).
The other component of the research was to develop these
approaches into a concrete methodology adapted specifically
to Arctic natural resource decisions and to test them on real
cases in Siberia and Alaska, both past and present. The
Russian team, Andre’eva and Larichev, carried out the field-
work and qualitative decision analysis of the Yamal case.
Everyone participated in the fieldwork associated with the
Alaskan permitting case, but the American and Russian
teams carried out separate analyses according to their respec-
tive quantitative and qualitative methods.
We discuss oil and gas development in the Arctic as an
example of major natural resource decisions and the role of
decision aids in clarifying how those decisions are made. We
then give the Russian and American case studies. The former
addresses a single decision: whether to pipe gas from the
Yamal Peninsula over the land or under the sea. The latter
addresses a class of decisions: what procedure federal regu-
lators should adopt in deciding whether to permit oil and gas
construction projects in Alaska. Finally, we discuss general
implications for the Arctic natural resource decision process.
BACKGROUND:
ARCTIC OIL AND GAS DEVELOPMENT
Russia
Soviet gas development during the 1970s and 1980s was
a specific effort to create a “gas bridge” between the present
use of oil to produce energy and a nuclear and coal future.
Gustafson (1989) argues that the development of gas was
necessary following many years in which the centrally planned
economy needed expanding oil production to survive. The
opening of the Western Siberian fields and the construction of
pipelines that would carry gas to Western Europe trans-
formed the industry. Gas produced 40% of export earnings by
the late 1980s. The Soviet Union expanded gas production by
50% in five years starting in 1980–81, an expansion that
required a huge commitment of resources and development in
Arctic areas. The original idea, held in the late 1970s, had
been to develop the northern fields simultaneously with
Urengoy, Russia’s largest gas field. The cost of development,
the lack of foreign capital, and the sudden decision to expand
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gas production dictated that all resources be aimed at the
large, more southern field. Thus, the development of
Yamburg and Yamal, the northern fields, was postponed.
By the late 1980s, when the more northern fields were
needed to continue meeting targets, conditions had changed.
In 1989, a report from a state expert panel raised questions
about the environmental consequences of gas pipeline con-
struction on the Yamal Peninsula (Expert Commission, 1989).
This report held up construction of the pipeline that would
carry gas from the Yamal fields (Fig. 1). Then the collapse of
the Soviet Union and the ensuing economic turmoil inter-
vened. In 1993, it was apparent that the income from gas
production was a necessity for the Russian economy, but gas
production had actually declined. President Yeltsin made the
decision to develop the pipeline and open the fields for
production. National economic security overrode other con-
siderations. The only question that remained was which
pipeline route would be used to move the gas to European
markets. The pressure to develop these fields increased as gas
production continued to fall in 1994 and 1995.
But national environmental groups, some with interna-
tional backing, have begun to play a role familiar in Western
petroleum development cases. Those responsible for both
development and regulation now find themselves in a posi-
tion where their decisions require justification to a much
broader audience than during the Soviet period.
The United States
In December 1968, an oil company discovered the largest
oil field ever found in North America at Prudhoe Bay on the
North Slope of Alaska (Fig. 2). A pipeline was needed to
transport the oil to the ice-free port of Valdez in Prince
William Sound more than 1000 km away on the southern
coast. Alaska Native land claims and environmental concerns
held up construction for almost five years.
Congress removed these roadblocks, first by the passage
of the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act of 1971, then by
overriding the environmental concerns in response to the
Arab oil boycott of 1973–74. The United States, dependent
on oil imports, had been vulnerable to the boycott. A large
field on domestic territory held the attraction of regaining
control over the country’s supply. The boycott experience
convinced the American public that domestic sources of oil
were important to the national weal. From the time that the
pipeline began to carry oil in 1977 until the late 1980s, when
lower prices and field depletion led to declining domestic
production, the United States produced over half of the oil it
consumed (Flanders, 1993). The development of the pipeline
and the North Slope fields appeared to be a successful
national policy.
In the 1980s, however, the environment reappeared as a
counterconcern. The conflict settled on the coastal plain of
the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR). Congress had
understood the potential of the refuge for petroleum when
officially recognizing it in the Alaska National Interest Lands
Conservation Act of 1980: Section 1002 of the Act left open
the possibility that the coastal plain could be explored and
developed.
Allowing oil development in a wildlife refuge provided a
powerful environmental cause, and environmental groups
staged an effective campaign against development. In 1991,
Congress voted against ANWR development. The decision
was not final, however. Both sides, environmentalists and
industry, see permitting decisions on smaller fields as skir-
mishes preliminary to another ANWR battle.
The state and regional governments have also benefited
from North Slope development. Since 1977, Alaska has
earned over 80% of its income from the oil industry. As
production declines on the North Slope, state revenues will
fall. The North Slope Borough taxes both real estate and
personal property, which means that it receives revenue on
the value of both the lease-hold and the equipment at the oil
fields. The borough has also taken on substantial debt. Its
future ability to pay its creditors depends upon continuing oil
production within the borough.
DECISION ANALYSIS
Decision analysis is a broad paradigm for the systematic
evaluation of alternative actions, based on all available infor-
mation, as a basis for choice among them. Its purpose is
normally to make decisions better and clearer. Its inputs
capture the knowledge and judgement of decision makers:
their perception of what the options are, what the options’
consequences might be, and the relative importance of crite-
ria characterizing these consequences. The class of decisions
involved here concerns two or more discrete options that can
be evaluated according to two or more criteria.
Decision analysis has two variants: qualitative and quan-
titative. Qualitative or categorical decision analysis (CDA)
relies on natural language and non-numerical categorization
of the considerations in a choice. Quantitative or numerical
decision analysis (NDA) represents uncertainty and value in
the form of numbers and combines them in a quantitative
model (derived from statistical decision theory). The qualita-
tive analysis has been associated with Russian decision
analysis; the quantitative, with Western decision making.
The two approaches may draw out different aspects of the
same problem.
The Russian Approach
Descriptions of the methodological base of CDA are in
Larichev (1987, 1992) and Larichev and Moshkovich (1997).
CDA tries to use the natural language of the decision maker,
active parties, and potential experts to structure a problem.
The goal of structuring is to define the criteria to be evaluated
for the initially given options. For each criterion, an evalua-
tion scale is constructed with a small number of quality grades
ranging from best to worst. These are drawn from natural
language, for example, “no damage to the environment”;
“moderate damage to the environment”; “major damage to
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FIG. 1. Proposed pipeline routes and gas fields, Yamal Peninsula, Russia. The sea route (solid line) crosses Baydaratskaya Bay from the Bovanenkova field.
The land route (dashed line) follows the proposed railway line around the bay.
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FIG. 2. Major oil fields, North Slope, Alaska, USA. The Niakuk and Badami fields are noted by underlining and italics.
the environment.” When major measurement difficulties
exist, relative (rather than absolute) evaluations of the options
are recommended (Oseredko et al., 1982; Huber and Huber,
1987).
Larichev and Moshkovich (1997) describe the special
methods CDA uses for comparing alternatives through these
verbal evaluations. Pair-wise compensation is one such
method: used when the initially given options are few; it
compares the options qualitatively, pulling out their relative
merits and deficiencies. At every stage of the decision proc-
ess, CDA helps the decision maker reduce the decision to a
more manageable size. For instance, evaluations on criteria
that are not really different are eliminated. By this means, the
number of evaluative criteria for comparison is reduced.
This method then tries to find a condition where the
disadvantages of one option outweigh the disadvantages of
the other. First, the decision maker ranks the disadvantages of
the two options separately. Then special reference options are
created and presented to the decision maker. The options have
the same number of criteria as the original problem, but they
only retain the original, real differences in one or two criteria.
For the other criteria, both options put forward the best (or
worst) evaluations. The decision maker is then asked to
choose between the two reference options. Put another way,
the decision maker is asked: Given the other criteria being
equal, which of these two options would you prefer when they
differ on these two (or one) criteria? When comparing the
reference options, the decision maker goes through the pair-
wise comparisons and, for each pair, chooses one option’s
disadvantages over those of the other. If all the disadvantages
of one option are found to be less harmful than those of the
other, the problem is solved. When comparing the two refer-
ence options, the decision maker performs a psychologically
valid operation (Larichev, 1992).
When only doing qualitative comparisons, one can end up
with a situation of noncomparability. Noncomparability oc-
curs when some evaluations are better for the first option and
some better for the second. To resolve this problem, a new,
more promising option is sought that could be better than the
two initially given. The method used helps the decision maker
to find the minimum changes needed in the evaluations of
existing options to create a new, better alternative.
In Russia, as in the United States, many active groups
participate in Arctic-related decisions, including local au-
thorities, the local population, and the company responsible
for construction. In the post-Soviet period, reaching agree-
ment among all active groups is a necessity. Decision analysis
plays a special role in Russian Arctic problems by examining
the positions of different active groups, identifying the favored
alternative for each group, and preparing for negotiations
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among them. The same analysis is carried out with all the
different active groups, and differences in positions are
analyzed. New options are developed with the idea of finding
agreement among groups.
The American Approach
Numerical decision analysis (NDA) essentially translates
judgement and knowledge relevant to evaluating some choice
into a quantitative model (Raiffa, 1968; Zeckhauser et al.,
1996). Normally, NDA calculates a numerical value for each
option, so that the best option is clear. For example, probabil-
ity and utility values are attached to each possible conse-
quence of an option, and the option with the highest
probability-weighted expected utility is logically preferred.
This type of model often suits a case where uncertainty is
critical.
In many environmental management decisions, the criti-
cal issue is conflicting objectives, and another common
model often works well. The competing criteria are listed
along with the decision-maker’s numerical judgement of
their relative importance. The impact of each option on each
criterion is evaluated separately from the importance of each
criterion. The preferred option is the one with the highest
importance-weighted impact. High impact in areas of little
importance can balance out small impact in areas of great
importance.
An NDA approach is normally comprehensive: it should
characterize all considerations (values and assessments) rel-
evant to a choice, even if at a highly aggregate level. For
example, an importance-weighted impact model does not
attempt to reduce the number of criteria per se, though it may
group them into fewer classes.
The NDA may use qualitative assessments and natural
language preparatory to developing numerical values. This
qualitative step may prove all that is necessary, and leaders in
the field recommend it.
The differences between the two approaches may be seen
through specific applications. The literature is largely limited
to comparisons of verbal and numerical treatments of the
uncertainty aspect of decision analysis (Erev and Cohen,
1990; Rapoport et al., 1990; Hamm, 1991; Wallsten et al.,
1993).
THE RUSSIAN CASE:
GAS TRANSPORT FROM YAMAL
 Background
As noted, the development of the Yamal gas fields has
become a matter of national importance. However, this devel-
opment has many unresolved problems. An essential one is
the choice between two routes connecting the gas fields to the
existing gas pipeline system. A senior Russian official wanted
to get reliable confirmation that RAO Gazprom’s preliminary
choice was the best. RAO Gazprom is the joint stock company
developing the project. The Russian authors of this paper
have been working with various stakeholders in the decision.
During the development of the project, the idea of straighten-
ing the pipeline route by crossing Baydaratskaya Bay (the sea
route) received strong support. The second option (the land
route) would cross the Yamal Peninsula to the east of the bay.
The choice has been the subject of bitter discussion between
two project institutes over several years. The gas project
institute Giprospetsgaz in St. Petersburg favored the land
route, but the gas project institute Yusniiprogaz in Donetsk
(Ukraine) proposed crossing the bay. Both institutes have
arguments for and against the sea and land routes. The
decision and the start of pipeline construction were recently
postponed, partly because of the complexity of this choice.
Thus, the task is one of decision making with two options.
This problem concerns unknown natural conditions, the
interests of different groups influencing the choice, and
contradictory appraisals of the alternatives on various crite-
ria, as well as other things. For a more detailed description of
this case, see Andre’eva et al. (1995).
Two Options
The two options are the sea route crossing the bay and the
land route. The following distinguishing characteristics or
criteria were initially included in the analysis: (1) length of
the route; (2) terms of construction; (3) time for construction;
(4) cost of construction; (5) impact on the environment; (6)
risk of a pipeline rupture accident; (7) consequences of a
pipeline rupture accident; (8) time needed to recover from an
accident; and (9) uncertain and unknown factors. With
respect to (6), the option of crossing Baydaratskaya Bay
involves unique features that could cause an accident: (a) the
instability of the shore because of permafrost processes and
sea ice impact; (b) the rupture of or damage to the pipeline
through ice scouring; and (c) the capability of icebergs to
reach Baydaratskaya Bay. With respect to (9), the analysis
points out that the decision must be made under conditions of
major uncertainty because the construction start date has
been set for the near future.
Active Groups
Before comparing the two options, we must analyze who
will make the choice and how. A single decision maker is not
likely to make the decision because of the high project cost.
On the contrary, several institutions and organizations, or
“active groups,” are taking part directly or indirectly in the
decision. They are: (1) RAO Gazprom, which ordered the
development of the project and must evaluate and confirm the
pipeline route, and its operational division in North Siberia,
Nadymgazprom; (2) the two project research institutes that
developed the two options; (3) two government ministries,
the Ministry of the Economy, which evaluates the project’s
economics, and the Russian Federation Committee for the
Protection of the Environment and Natural Resources, which
evaluates its ecological effects; (4) the local authorities in the
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Yamal region, who must give their agreement to one option
of the pipeline; and (5) local communities and representatives
of Native peoples, whose territory and resources will be
affected by the construction of the pipeline system. The active
groups have different interests, and one might expect that the
groups would support different options.
The Application of Russian CDA to the Yamal Case
It is logical to take into account only the criteria for which
one can find an essential difference between the options. For
example, the preliminary estimate shows that the required
construction time is 5–7 years for both options. The unstable
national economic situation can affect the starting time.
Because this problem exists for both options, the analysis can
ignore the problem, as it is not relevant to a choice between
the two. Route length, time of construction, and terms of
construction can be considered under the criterion “cost.”
The terms of construction can also be considered under
“probability of an accident,” since difficult conditions can
affect the quality of construction and hence increase the
likelihood of a future accident. The relevant criteria and their
evaluations are shown in Table 1:
1. Cost. The cost of crossing Baydaratskaya Bay (Csea)
was determined by a foreign firm that is ready to
construct this part of the pipeline. The initial estimates
show that Csea is a little higher than Cland.
2. Ecological impact. Both options would have a negative
impact on the environment. Though the sea option
contains some uncertainty, ecological impact is much
larger for the land option: a land pipeline would cross a
lot of land and many rivers.
3. Probability of accident. Because of unstable shores and
the possibility of ice scouring, the probability of an
accident is higher for the sea option.
4. Consequences of the accident. An accident on land is
usually connected with an explosion and destruction of
the environment. A sea accident would not cause an
explosion, but the gas would rise through the water and
cracks in the ice. The land option is clearly worse.
5. Reliability of gas supply. The repair of the pipeline after
an accident would require much more time under the
sea option, particularly since the bay is ice-free for only
60–70 days per year. The sea option is clearly worse.
6. Uncertain and unknown factors. Many more uncertain
and unknown factors are connected with the realization
of the unique project of crossing Baydaratskaya Bay.
The sea option is clearly worse.
These comparative, qualitative evaluations are practically
all we can measure; other qualitative measurements are more
difficult. How does one draw conclusions with such weak
measurements?
As noted, CDA methods do not guarantee that pair-wise
comparisons of the disadvantages of two alternatives will
always lead to a clear preference. This situation resulted with
TABLE 1. CDA analysis of gas pipeline routes from the Yamal
Peninsula (Russia).
Criteria Sea Option Land Option
Cost Csea Cland1
Ecological impact Esea Eland
Probability of accident Psea Pland
Consequences of accident Asea Aland
Reliability of gas supply Rsea Rland
Uncertain and unknown factors Usea Uland
1 The favored option according to each criterion is indicated by
bold italics, e.g., Cland indicates that the land option is less costly.
the two Yamal pipeline options. The greater uncertainty and
lesser reliability of gas supply for the sea option were worse
than the ecological impact from the land option. But the
negative consequences of an accident under the land option
were worse than the greater probability of an accident under
the sea option. The research team, working with the decision
makers and experts, undertook the development of a new,
more promising option from the existing ones.
A method for aiding strategic choice called ASTRIDA
(Berkeley et al., 1991) was employed to define a new and
potentially best option. In the case of incomparability,
ASTRIDA proposes the modification of one existing option.
That is, the method asks the question: what needs to be
changed in one option to make it clearly equal to or better than
the other option? Below is the analysis corresponding to the
interests of RAO Gazprom.
A new sea route option resulted from the search for ways
to change the characteristics of the sea route. Discussions
with experts suggested ways in which the negative aspects of
that option could be removed:
To eliminate problems from seashore instability, the pipeline
could be put through special shafts at a safe distance from the
shore. This construction would incur additional costs (Cshafts).
To avoid damage to the pipeline from ice scouring, the
pipeline could be laid in special trenches 1.5–2 m deep. As
these trenches would be deeper than those called for in the
project plan, the costs (Ctrenches) would also be additional.
To eliminate the danger from icebergs, a special observa-
tion service and a ship to drag an iceberg away would be used.
The cost of the service and ship is denoted by Cice.
Adding these features to the sea option creates a new
alternative with an element of uncertainty that is approxi-
mately equal (from the point of view of the experts) to that of
the traditional land option. With the development of a special
repair service for the underwater pipes, the reliability of the
gas supply could be made equal. Thus, no significant differ-
ences would exist between the sea and land routes except cost
and ecological impact. The cost of the new sea option (Csea
 
+
Cshaft
 
+ Ctrenches
 
+ Cice) would clearly be higher and the land
option would still create greater environmental destruction.
But now the comparison can be considered as one between
higher costs (sea) and lower environmental protection (land).
The comparison between two factors presents a real, crucial
choice to be made.
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Analogous analyses were made from the positions of other
active groups. The development of a new option was useful
in this case, too. With regard to the two initial options, only
the positions of the local authorities and local population
were clear: they supported the sea option. The new sea option
was also more attractive to the Russian Federation Commit-
tee for the Protection of the Environment and to Nadym-
gazprom. But, the positions of Gazprom and the Ministry of
the Economy in the final, crucial choice presented above were
influenced by the difficult financial situation in Russia. The
Ministry was inclined toward the less costly land route.
The Influence of Recommendations
Our report, with the recommendations presented above,
was given to RAO Gazprom. At that time, the original sea
option was more attractive to the majority of the organiza-
tion’s managers. The intention to begin pipeline construction
was strong, and they had expected that the report would
support this option. Instead, the report added doubts about its
acceptability, and construction was postponed. One reason
was the uncertain and unknown factors described by the
report. During the delay, new investigations were undertaken
on the problem of seashore instability and ice regimes in
Baydaratskaya Bay. These studies were an objective confir-
mation that the available data were insufficient to ensure safe
operations.
That delay has now turned into a cancellation. Market
prices have been too low, problems of investment remain
unresolved, and drilling in an unstable sandy-permafrost
surface still presents complex engineering challenges.
AMOCO, which had a major interest in the area, has pulled
out completely. It appears that the fields will not be developed
until 2005, and liquid natural gas (LNG) ships are under
assessment as an alternative to pipelines for transporting gas
out of the region when development does take place.
Possible NDA of the Yamal Case
NDA could be attempted on the same problem. Larichev
et al. (1995), for example, present a hypothetical “impor-
tance-weighted impact” model based on the same set of
criteria: cost, ecology, accident risk, etc. However, instead of
presenting the perspective of each active group (as in the
above CDA), the model could represent the view of someone
wishing to decide which pipeline route best served the na-
tion’s interest or to argue the case before a public audience.
For example, a responsible citizen or government official
might supply the impact and importance inputs, and the
conclusions would be attributed to that person.
The evaluation scale was from 0 to -100, where 0 is no
impact of any kind, and -100 is the worst plausible impact
under a particular criterion. On one illustrative set of inputs
proposed by a research colleague, the land route scored -20
and the sea route scored -15. So that evaluator apparently
favored the less damaging sea route. She considered ecology
to be the most important criterion and assessed the land route
to have a significantly larger impact. The effect of alternative
inputs by the same or other evaluators could be readily
calculated.
THE AMERICAN CASE: A PERMITTING PROCEDURE
FOR OIL CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS
Setting
The Russian case addresses how to help make a single,
still-active decision. The American case addresses how to
develop a reusable procedure for a class of future decisions.
A major recurring decision facing U.S. regulators with
responsibility for Arctic development is whether to permit
Alaskan oil construction projects, with or without restric-
tions. A number of parties, including industry and environ-
mental groups, have been concerned that controversial
decisions—such as whether to allow oil drilling in the
Alaskan National Wildlife Refuge—are often subject to
arbitrary and unpredictable pressures, for example, major
shifts in the political climate. They have clamored for a
standardized, “scientific” procedure that would not be
susceptible to manipulation.
The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (CoE) Alaska District
has primary responsibility for evaluating permit applications,
using the wetlands guidelines of the Clean Water Act. Typi-
cally one analyst within the Regulatory Branch makes a
recommendation, based upon available evidence, through the
Branch Chief to the District Engineer, who confers with
various other federal and state agencies before rendering a
decision.
Research Task
Our research team decided to first test the technical feasi-
bility of our ideas on a past permitting incident: whether to
permit British Petroleum (BP) to build a causeway to its
Niakuk oil field in the Arctic Ocean. Though CoE personnel
provided extensive input on specific aspects of the case,
including the criteria that are used in deciding permits, we felt
that the issue was still too controversial to show how their
analysis might have been done. We chose instead to show the
results as if the applicant were putting forward its argument
based upon the categories and definitions of impacts that the
CoE might use. We put together the evaluation described here
entirely from secondary sources. BP, the actual applicant, had
no input.
Niakuk Background
In the late 1980s, BP sought permission to develop the
Niakuk oil field from an artificial island about 2 km offshore
in the Beaufort Sea, using a gravel causeway to pipe the oil
ashore. The Alaska District of CoE gave a conditional permit
that did not allow for the construction of the proposed
causeway, on the grounds that the proposal did not meet the
270 •  N.E. FLANDERS et al.
TABLE 2. NDA hypothetical qualitative analysis of Niakuk (Alaska) permit application. Positive consequences are given in bold. An
asterisk (“*”) indicates an unacceptable level of impact, and a dagger (“†”) indicates that the option is economically impracticable on
that criterion.
Affected party Type of consequence Causeway Slant drilling Interpretation of Unacceptable Importance
impacts impacts very high impact
General public (environmental concerns)
Fish populations High* Very low 10 years to restore High ♦♦
Animal populations Very low Very low 10 years to restore Low ♦♦♦
Aquatic sites (wetlands) Low Low Comparable to Everglades High ♦♦
Other fauna (endangered species) Very low Very low 5% probability of extinction —— ♦♦♦
Water quality Very low Medium* 2 spills over project life Low ♦♦
Wilderness/ecology High Low Comparable to Deadhorse —— ♦♦
National interest
Oil independence Very low Very low 5% less oil imports —— ♦♦♦
State and local
Revenue (royalties) Low Very low $1B over life of field —— ♦♦
Local population
Fisheries Very low Very low 1 major species out 1 year —— ♦♦
Subsistence (waterfowl) Very low Very low 1 major species out 1 year —— ♦
Employment Low Low 200 more permanent jobs —— ♦
Economy Very low Very low 20% improvement —— ♦
Industry
Niakuk profitability Medium Very low† $1B earnings Very low† ♦♦♦
Other BP profitability Very high Low $1B earnings ♦♦♦
Other firms’ profitability High Very Low $1B earnings —— ♦♦♦
terms of an agreement between the oil companies and federal
regulators to maintain fish habitat. A regulatory guideline
[404(b)(1) of the Clean Water Act] says that, irrespective of
other considerations, a permit has to be denied if a fish
population would be adversely affected. The agreement among
the companies and agencies had been to judge potential
changes in fish populations on the basis of changes in habitat.
Causeways were believed to affect the habitat of arctic cisco
by changing coastal current patterns. The senior official
judged the causeway to have overall social value; however,
under existing regulatory procedures, regulators cannot trade
off some negative environmental impacts against other posi-
tive values.
The Alaska District also issued a general directive favoring
alternative means of accessing offshore oil, such as slant
drilling from the shore, over causeways. This directive
raised the case from a single decision to a precedent, with
implications for further development. BP had argued against
slant drilling, on the grounds that it was more costly than
causeway construction—costly enough to prevent devel-
opment of the field.
The federal government put pressure on CoE headquarters
in Washington to rescind these decisions, pending additional
data. CoE acquiesced. A Congressional committee in turn
challenged this reversal, claiming improper industrial influ-
ence. BP ultimately dropped the causeway in favor of slant
drilling (which, in fact, proved quite profitable, as slant
drilling allows greater recovery).
Research Effort
We sought an aid that would help make the regulator’s
decision process sounder, smoother, more defensible, and
less wasteful of national resources. The research team met
with the regulator (Alaska District of CoE) four years after
the events described, to develop an NDA-oriented aid that
could have been used to support the initial local permitting
application. The analysis was intended to reflect faithfully
whatever knowledge and thinking had been available to BP at
the time (without attempting to improve them). Its contribu-
tion was to find the best way to communicate the likely
consequences of each of three permitting options (no oil field,
oil field with a causeway, and oil field without a causeway)
and to determine if those consequences were acceptable.
We considered three alternative formats: qualitative,
graphic, and numerical (Table 2, Figs. 3 and 4). In each case
we took into account all consequences—economic, environ-
mental, strategic, etc.—no matter how intangible. Impor-
tance and impact judgements were separately defined and
independently evaluated. We considered both the existing
decision regime, in which thresholds eliminated an option,
and an alternative one, in which decision makers could
consider that the good aspects of an option might compensate
for its bad aspects.
Qualitative Representation
The first two columns of Table 2 list consequences, grouped
by who is mainly affected. Consequences in bold indicate
positive impacts. Columns 3 and 4 predict consequences for
each option. They show that some impacts are more accept-
able with slant drilling (very low impact on fish population)
and some are better with the causeway (water quality).
Column 5 clarifies the meaning of the levels of impact by
defining “very high impact.” In the case of “fish population,”
for example, it is interpreted as “10 years to restore” (or
equivalent harm). Column 6 indicates what is unacceptable
according to statute. For example, if statutory limits were the
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FIG. 3. NDA hypothetical graphic analysis of Niakuk (Alaska) permit application, using bar graphs. Vertical lines, labelled “Max” or “Min” indicate an unacceptable
impact. The black portion of the horizontal bars indicates impacts favoring slant drilling, while the cross-hatching indicates those favoring the causeway. In this
graphical presentation, impact and importance are separate. The NDA analysis maintains separate rows for all of the criteria that must go into the decision.
controlling principle, the impact on fish population alone
would make the causeway unacceptable.
On the other hand if, contrary to literal interpretation of
the current regulations, compensation among impacts were
allowed, the preferred option would depend on which
impact is more important, as shown in the last column. In
practice, a regulator may stretch interpretation of thresh-
olds to take trade-offs into account. This qualitative for-
mat may help regulators make the necessary evaluation
informally.
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FIG. 4. NDA hypothetical graphic analysis of Niakuk (Alaska) permit application, using boxes. Impact and importance are combined into boxes. Width represents
impact and height importance. The small vertical line indicates an unacceptable or impractical impact. The black portion of the boxes indicates that slant drilling
is favored. The cross-hatching indicates that the causeway is favored. An observer or decision maker can readily compare areas and see the similarity between a
small impact on a criterion of great importance and a large impact on an area of less importance. The two bars at the bottom graphically display the sum of the net
differences in areas.
ARCTIC OIL AND GAS DEVELOPMENT • 273
Graphic Format
Figure 3 expresses essentially all the same judgements as
Table 2, but quantitatively, in a graphic format, and more
precisely. The level of impact, positive or negative, of each
option on each consequence, is represented by a horizontal
bar. For example, in “fish population,” “high” impact is
represented by a bar that is long, but not as long as a bar for
the maximum or “very high” impact. (Equivalently, that
impact could be given a numerical score on a scale from 0–
100, correspondingly defined). The small vertical line above
the bar labelled “Max” indicates the maximum acceptable
impact, noted as “high” for “fish population” impact of
“causeway” in Table 2, but now more precisely represented
as a little less than the width of the box—and therefore again
characterized as “unacceptable.” The bar in the final column
represents importance weight, corresponding to the number
of stars in the last column of Table 2. The long bar for “fish
population” corresponds to three stars in Table 2. However,
it is less high than the bar for “animal population,” which also
got three stars in Table 2, reflecting the greater precision of
Figure 3.
In Figure 4, two dimensions of impact and importance are
combined as the area of the box (that is, as the product of
impact and importance). This area indicates the net effect of
an option’s consequence on that criterion. Thus, the cause-
way has a significant effect via fish population (as shown by
a large box) because the size of the impact is large and the
importance is substantial (but not as high as some others.)
By comparing the total area of boxes favoring causeway
(shown black) with those favoring slant drilling (cross-
hatched), we have an indication of which option is preferred.
Since the causeway area is clearly much larger than the slant
drilling area, the causeway option should be accepted, ac-
cording to this example. One can see by eye that the greater
area favoring causeway is due largely to the high impact and
high importance attached to three measures of industry prof-
itability. This evaluation is what one might expect from an oil
company applicant. The regulators do not have to accept
these importance weights, of course; they can substitute their
own assessments when coming to a decision.
Although numbers can communicate the same assess-
ments, these graphic representations can be better for com-
munication. Whereas the numbers themselves may be difficult
for a lay person to understand, the relative shape and size of
the different boxes can convey the important differences.
Finally, the boxes may avoid conveying a false precision.
Whereas the decision maker may not intend to imply a
precision of, say, 35 (as opposed to 34 or 36), the box diagram
does not necessarily convey anything but a fairly rough
estimate.
Handling Uncertainty
This graphical format does not capture uncertainty (nor
does the qualitative format). A single quantity represents
each impact prediction, regardless of how suspect the
assessment may be. Although uncertainty may be important
for a risk-averse decision maker, if the causeway impacts are
plausibly no more uncertain than for slant drilling, the cause-
way would still be preferred. The decision maker can always
discount the value of very uncertain impacts by making
single-number estimates conservative. However, it may be
helpful to register the uncertainty explicitly, to make clear to
any observer where the “net” impact estimate came from.
Though we could not do it here, one could handle this by
shading the boxes darker for more certain estimates, or
simply by adding the words “low,” “medium,” or “high” in a
column for uncertainty.
A purely numerical presentation can incorporate estimates
of uncertainty algebraically. If each impact is assigned a
margin of error, e.g., 10 ± 30, an overall margin of error for
the net value of each option can be approximated by a
formula.
Note that “uncertainty” as used here refers to both the
doubt of the decision maker toward the given estimate and the
amount of possible variation in the particular criteria. On the
whole, however, the decision makers were most concerned
about the precision of a given estimate.
Live Decision: Badami
BP recently proposed development of another new field on
the North Slope, called Badami. The American team met with
a regulator and used the decision aid to analyze two options
under the then active permit request. (BP has subsequently
withdrawn this particular request and has provided a new
one). In the plan to develop Badami, BP proposed several
innovations that would have reduced environmental impact.
These include a small footprint for the drilling pad that takes
advantage of slant drilling, transportation of materials to the
site during winter to eliminate the need for a road, and chilled
rather than heated oil in the pipeline. One reading of this effort
suggests that in addition to making the Badami field more
harmonious with the landscape, the approach could set a
precedent for development in ANWR.
The regulator identified the pipeline construction plan as
the key issue in deciding on the permit. The pipeline would
have connected the field with the Trans-Alaska Pipeline
System. The proposer, BP, wanted to bury the pipeline
completely, even at river crossings. Traditionally, pipelines
cross rivers on bridges, so completely burying the pipeline
would have been new. Buried pipelines cause a problem by
dissipating heat into the surrounding permafrost, causing the
development of thermokarsts around the pipe. For this reason,
pipelines are generally kept aboveground in permafrost areas.
BP proposed new technology to overcome this problem.
At river crossings, the pipeline would be put below ice
scour depth. Sagbends, dips in the pipeline on either side of
the river crossing, would be set back from the river bank far
enough to allow a gradual transition to a deeper substream
level and avoid the effects from bank erosion. The pipeline
would require four major and multiple minor creek crossings.
The regulator felt that consideration should be concentrated
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TABLE 3. NDA hypothetical numerical analysis of Badami (Alaska) permit decision.
Completely Buried Buried Except at Crossings Advantage
Consequence, impact on Importance1 Impact Uncertainty2 Contribution3 Impact Uncertainty2 Contribution3 Buried
Special aquatic sites impact -0.3 15 0.15 -4.5 7 0.15 -2.1 -2.4
Anadromous fish - Sea -1 5 0.15 -5 5 0.15 -5 0
Anadromous fish - River -1 5 0.15 -5 5 0.15 -5 0
Anadromous fish - positive effect 1 50 0.15 50 45 0.15 45 5
Other fish/aquatics -0.3 5 0.15 -1.5 5 0.15 -1.5 0
Wildlife -0.3 5 0.15 -1.5 10 0.15 -3 1.5
Marine mammals -0.3 5 0.15 -1.5 5 0.15 -1.5 0
Other endangered species -1 5 0.15 -5 5 0.15 -5 0
Ecosystem -1 5 0.15 -5 5 0.15 -5 0
Permafrost integrity -1 15 0.8 -15 5 0.15 -5 -10
Physical properties -0.7 5 0.15 -3.5 5 0.15 -3.5 0
Circulation -0.15 5 0.15 -0.75 5 0.15 -0.75 0
Erosion, accretion -0.5 10 0.5 -5 5 0.15 -2.5 -2.5
Turbidity -0.1 5 0.15 -0.5 5 0.15 -0.5 0
Ice dynamics -0.5 5 0.15 -2.5 5 0.15 -2.5 0
Oil pollution -0.7 5 0.3 -3.5 5 0.15 -3.5 0
Other water quality -0.15 5 0.15 -0.75 5 0.15 -0.75 0
Soil quality -0.5 5 0.15 -2.5 5 0.15 -2.5 0
Fisheries -0.1 5 0.15 -0.5 5 0.15 -0.5 0
Energy 1 15 0.15 15 15 0.15 15 0
Pro-wilderness sentiment -1 40 0.15 -40 40 0.15 -40 0
Native way of life -0.5 5 0.15 -2.5 5 0.15 -2.5 0
State/borough oil finances 0.8 40 0.15 32 40 0.15 32 0
Construction business and employment 0.8 30 0.15 24 30 0.15 24 0
Operations business and employment 0.8 10 0.15 8 10 0.15 8 0
Other state/borough finances 0.2 10 0.15 2 5 0.15 1 1
Other -0.2 5 0.15 -1 15 0.15 -3 2
Badami income for BP 0.3 20 0.15 6 10 0.15 3 3
Precedent for industry 0.3 50 0.15 15 10 0.15 3 12
Meeting applicant’s purpose 0.7 100 0 70 70 0.15 49 21
Precedent for environmentalists -0.3 35 0.15 -10.5 10 0.15 -3 -7.5
Totals 20.89 104.5 16.75 81.4 23.1
1 A negative number indicates the importance of a negative impact.
2 Total uncertainty equals the square root of the sum of the estimated uncertainties for each criterion.
3 Contribution equals importance times impact.
on this issue. Opponents to the permit had also highlighted the
innovative pipeline design, though the permit itself was
relatively uncontroversial.
The research team used essentially the same format analy-
sis as with the Niakuk case. The difference was in the
arrangement of effects. The final analysis was done by the
regulator without the American team present, three months
after the original meeting.
Since the permit decision is still active, and BP’s applica-
tion has changed since the analysis, we cannot display the
resulting table. Table 3 does, however, have a similar struc-
ture and outcome to what the regulator gave. The research
team’s analysis also included hypothetical judgements of
uncertainty to show how these might look. The completely
buried pipeline is displayed as being more in the public
interest than the pipeline raised over stream crossings, with
an evaluation of 104.5 ± 20.89 versus 81.4 ± 16.75. In the
researchers’ rendering of the table, the completely buried
option had positive effects from gravel pits in creating im-
proved habitat for anadromous fish, in the precedent effect for
the industry, and in meeting the applicant’s purpose. The
major negative difference was in the possible impact on
permafrost integrity. The table suggests that the completely
buried option may have a greater and more uncertain effect on
permafrost integrity. This uncertainty reflected the relative
newness of the approach. Other major negatives might be
possible erosion and setting what environmentalists might
consider a bad precedent.
CDA Analysis of Niakuk
Table 4 shows a qualitative analysis of the Niakuk
decision carried out by the Russian research team. The
analysis, which shows eight variables, was done from the
perspective of a regulator. It adds a third alternative to the
two considered in the NDA analysis: a subsea pipeline
below the ice scour level of the ocean’s floor. Of the
criteria, one is considered to have no difference among the
options: social consequences. Qualitative analysis does
not attempt to draw out every single point of difference in
detail. It seeks only the “broad brush strokes.”
Because of the threshold for anadromous fish, incorpo-
rated into the impact on the environment, the causeway was
considered unacceptable and was eliminated as an option.
The question then arose, was there another option that could
be used as a better alternative to slant drilling? The major
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TABLE 4. CDA hypothetical qualitative analysis of Niakuk (Alaska) permitting decision. The italics indicate the major differences among
the options.
Evaluation of Alternatives
Groups1 Criteria Causeway Slant Drilling Subsea Pipeline
ABC Impact on the environment Unacceptable2 Acceptable Acceptable
AB Damage to wilderness Big No Small
AB Social consequences – Equally negligible –
ABC Quantity of oil Basic volume Less Equal to basic
C Cost of construction Basic cost $14 – 30 million more (5 – 10%) $37 million more (10 – 15%)
A Oil independence Estimated input Less Equal
ABC Uncertain factors3 A few Very many Many
ABC Reliability of pipeline4 Normal Normal Less
1 Active groups: A = public; B = local authorities; C = oil companies.
2 The available knowledge confirms a real danger to the environment.
3 A lack of knowledge for effective realization of the alternatives.
4 Risk of accident: detecting and eliminating.
Most of these secondary criteria, though important to the
Arctic, are not Arctic-specific: they would be important for
public environmental decisions elsewhere in the world. Their
importance to the Arctic is a matter of degree rather than kind.
For example, complexity reduction addresses a problem that
is found throughout environmental decision making: how to
make comparisons across several different criteria that use
different measures and incorporate different levels of cer-
tainty (e.g., Committee on the Human Dimensions of Global
Change, 1994:18). However, decisions about Arctic resources
tend to be more public, because they are more likely to be on
public land and involve more groups with divergent interests.
Personal clarification and communication are also important
to any public policy decision. Communication may be more
difficult for Arctic issues because the topics and their impor-
tance may be farther from the knowledge of most people,
even those involved in government decision making. The
applicability of a decision tool to a class of decisions, and the
attendant ability to reuse it, will mean that the procedure can
become part of a management regime and provide a clear and
consistent approach to those decisions. A better understand-
ing on the part of the public is more likely to emerge.
Consideration of alternatives may be more important in the
Arctic because the environment may benefit from or require
new technology or approaches. An important corollary to the
consideration of alternatives is whether the methods aid the
search for compromises among groups. Arctic decisions
typically involve different interest groups within the same
level of government, among the levels of government, and
within the larger public. By extension, does one approach or
the other favor particular interests? This issue also raises
ease of use as a question, since more technical approaches
may favor better-educated or more experienced groups. The
incorporation of uncertainty is perhaps the most Arctic-
specific issue, because the Arctic environment is character-
ized by large seasonal and interannual variation; decision
makers have a poorer information base, as less research has
been conducted; and oil companies must deal with wellhead
price swings brought about by the large fixed costs for
differences between the two remaining options were found in
the cost of construction, the number of uncertain factors, and
the reliability of the pipeline. The buried pipeline had disad-
vantages in its extra cost and reduced reliability. Slant drilling
was disadvantageous in its many uncertain factors, which
might have blocked its effective realization.
At this point, the qualitative analysis would have needed to
know whether the disadvantages of the buried pipeline could
have been made at least equal to those of slant drilling. The
buried pipeline, according to the analysis, had a number of
advantages over the alternative. Reducing the cost of con-
struction or increasing the reliability to the level of slant
drilling might have made a buried pipeline a better alterna-
tive. In any case, the analysis can aid the decision maker by
showing where the major differences lie.
DISCUSSION: COMPARING APPROACHES
Because actual decision cases are used, an experimental
situation cannot be created in which “treated” and “un-
treated” parallel cases can be compared. The analyst or the
decision maker can only judge that the decision made with the
help of the decision aids was better than it might have been
otherwise. Does this limitation render a third-party evalua-
tion of decision aids completely impossible? Not entirely.
Secondary criteria can suggest whether a particular technique
is better to particular ends. In the case of the Arctic, these
secondary evaluation criteria can address the characteristic
needs of decision makers in this region of the globe.
Decision Issues Important to the Arctic
The two methods studied here suggest at least nine deci-
sion issues: complexity reduction, consideration of alterna-
tives, personal clarification for the decision maker, finding
compromises, favoring of interests, communication, ability
to reuse the method, ease of use, and incorporation of uncer-
tainty (Table 5).
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Dealing with Complexity
Considering Alternatives
Clarification for the Decision Maker
Finding Compromises
Favoring Stakeholder Groups
Communication
Ability to Reuse
Ease of Use
Incorporating Uncertainty
• Seeks numerical value for each
criterion on importance and impact
scales and combination of two.
• Allows direct  comparison of
alternatives and criteria through
scores, and suggests a decision.
• Does not require consideration of
alternatives, but can suggest them.
• Can consider compensating actions
that are not part of an alternative.
• Can point out whether analysis of
criteria is consistent with “gut” choice
between alternatives.
• Does not include compromise as an
integral part of method, but does allow
for trade-offs between criteria and,
thereby, stakeholders.
• Requires numeracy, which may
disfavor less educated groups.
• Harder to integrate rights-based
approach.
• Shows detail about how decision
maker weighed different criteria and
their impact.
• Can discuss numbers and alter them.
• Gives permit applicant a template with
which to work.
• Applies to a class of permitting
decisions.
• Can be used as template for permit
applications.
• Requires numeracy.
• May require training for decision
maker.
• Asks decision maker for estimate of
uncertainty.
• Provides overall uncertainty for     each
alternative.
• Public ownership of land and
environmental characteristics can
create several interacting issues.
• Interest groups can purposely create
complexity to prolong debate or shift
costs.
• Because most projects are unique,
alternatives are not well known.
• The public nature of decisions and
the possiblity of litigation require the
decision maker to reach a justifiable
decision.
• Multiple stakeholders participate in
public decisions.
• Stakeholder groups may differ widely
in education, power, and rights.
• Public has major involvement in
decisions.
• Public has low knowledge of
background and issues.
• Obscuring issues is a potential
stakeholder tactic.
• Tools can provide a general    approach
to unique Arctic issues.
• Tools can reduce the cost of ad
hoc approaches to environmental
decisions.
• At some decision-making levels,
educational attainment is low.
• The Arctic environment is highly
variable.
• Well-head prices are volatile.
• Unexpected costs may arise.
• Eliminates cri teria where no
differences exist.
• Seeks to reduce some criteria to dollar
amounts.
• Alters the negative features of one
alternative to create a new alternative.
• Creates “psychologically valid”
binary choices.
• Forces consideration of alternatives.
• Focuses on essential differences.
• Forces a decision maker to consider
alternatives.
• Because the method does not provide
a final decision, decision makers may
not necessarily see the implication of
their evaluation of criteria.
• Searches for alternative options,
including possible compromises.
• May encourage wider range of
stakeholder participation.
• Provides clear and quick description
of the decision problem.
• Focuses discussions by reducing
unnecessary complexity.
• Requires a new approach to analysis
for each decision problem.
• Is easily understandable.
• Considers uncertainty as one criterion.
• May transform uncertainty to the
dollar cost of removing it.
Criteria Categorical Numerical Importance to Arctic
TABLE 5. Comparison of CDA and NDA on aspects of decision making important to Arctic resource decisions.
transportation. Finally, because construction and operation
often use new techniques, it is difficult to figure accurately
the cost of any project. Prior experience may not be available
as a guide. Thus, uncertainty is a key issue.
Complexity Reduction
While decisions about oil and gas development in the
Arctic are often portrayed as a battle between development
and the environment, the skirmishes take place in several
arenas. Because development takes place on public land in
both Russia and the United States, several interest groups are
usually involved, each of which may have a distinct concern
or stake—or even more than one. Development, primarily a
consideration of economic interests, may concern the com-
pany carrying out the activity, the local or regional govern-
ment, or the federal government. All may have an interest in
seeing the development take place, but with enough differ-
ences among them, e.g., taxes versus profits, that they cannot
be considered to have the same interest. Complexity can arise
from defining those differences as aspects of the same na-
tional interest. Similarly, the environment is not a single
entity. Development may improve some aspects of the envi-
ronment, while negatively affecting others. Finally, within
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the United States, the battle often takes place in a legal forum.
Delay is a tactic, and creating complexity may be a way to
increase delay.
The qualitative approach eliminates much of the complex-
ity by reducing the question to the bare essential of differ-
ences. The quantitative method does not reduce the complexity
per se, but it brings to bear a common denominator. A chief
issue between the two methods is whether the numbers
created under the quantitative approach are “real”: do they
truly reflect psychological states in which numerical inter-
vals are equidistant and values placed on different impacts
follow a common scale allowing comparison? Both meth-
ods, each in their way, reduce complexity and thus achieve
a valuable public goal. This reduction allows both decision
makers and the general public who have no firsthand
knowledge of the Arctic to understand what the essential
issues are.
Consideration of Alternatives
The two methods differ considerably in whether they
force consideration of alternatives. The qualitative ap-
proach engenders a search for another alternative that has
not previously been considered. This alternative can be a
new variant developed by altering the negative features of
one approach, as seen in the Yamal case, or it can be an
entirely new method for solving the problem, as in the
Niakuk case. The quantitative approach, though it can
consider other alternatives, does not use their creation as
a tool in the analysis, nor does it force consideration of
alternatives. Someone looking for alternatives could use
NDA to locate the largest disadvantages of the existing
options and try to develop another option based on those
observations.
The forcing of alternatives can be important in the Arctic:
the unique conditions can call for new solutions to engineer-
ing problems. One example may be the development of freon-
filled pipeline supports in Alaska. Environmentalists raised
the concern that the originally proposed buried pipeline, or
even the supports of a raised pipeline, would cause
thermokarsts. The development of the supports solved this
problem, and probably saved the pipeline company consider-
able repair costs. The forcing of an alternative benefited both
the environment and the oil industry.
The quantitative approach, on the other hand, allows the
consideration of compensating actions. Thus, the analysis
may point out that a positive impact outweighs a negative one
in another category. The qualitative approach has no way of
considering this trade-off, because it does not attempt to
provide the means to cross-compare criteria unless compari-
sons can be made in money equivalents. For instance, an
applicant could propose to replace wetland in the project area
by creating wetland of equal or greater value in another area.
Compensating actions may be less feasible in the Arctic
environment, because slower biological processes would
lengthen the time needed to create, say, a new wetland or
other biophysical feature.
Clarification
Both methods clarify the decisions. The decision mak-
ers with whom we worked in both the United States and
Russia had a similar experience: after the first iteration on
the model, and after some time to think, they universally
revised their analyses to reflect what they thought was an
accurate model. In the quantitative approach, the clarifica-
tion came when the consequences of the modeling were
clear. The decision makers saw a result that was counter to
what they thought was the correct decision. That is, think-
ing about the individual factors influencing the decision
did not add up to the decision that a decision maker thought
correct. The decision maker then had the option of either
rethinking the individual factors or rethinking the deci-
sion. By forcing consistency, the decision analysis tech-
niques can help us avoid many of the decision-making
pathologies that plague ad hoc decisions.
The use of numbers in the analysis would add to the clarity
of a decision when scales are carefully constructed. A nu-
merical approach also clarifies by not reducing a complex
question such as the environment to a single factor: it main-
tains and deals with the multiple elements that make up any
key area of a decision. However, the quantitative approach is
not likely to lead to clarification, or communication, if the
people using it, or those to whom it is directed, are not
numerically sophisticated. The approach worked well with
decision makers in the Corps of Engineers because they were
trained scientists, but what about people in the small villages
of Alaska? No a priori assumptions can be made one way or
the other.
The non-numerical CDA analysis requires the decision-
making process to identify and deal with the essential differ-
ences between different options. That is, clarity is achieved
by eliminating factors for which there is no real difference or
which are not important to the decision maker, rather than
transforming them into numbers as in NDA.
Finding Compromises
NDA deals with single decision makers and their choices
among an existing group of alternatives. As noted under the
consideration of alternatives, it is possible to develop new
options from the old options, but they are not part of the
analysis. NDA does allow clearer trade-offs. CDA, in creat-
ing a new option when noncomparability exists, allows for
the consideration of different interests and can try to create a
compromise option based on an analysis of those interests.
Aiding compromise reduces the cost of any decision.
Favoring Interests
NDA could favor certain interest groups over others. First,
NDA requires greater numeracy, at least on the part of the
decision maker. This problem might be overcome with the
development of graphical prompting techniques. These tech-
niques would not ask for numerical evaluations, but rather
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whether a series of boxes captures a decision maker’s
thinking on a decision.
However, a second problem would be more difficult to
overcome. The quantitative approach is less able to deal with
a “rights-based” approach to a particular decision. Under a
rights-based approach, a group would not be willing to see its
interests traded off against others because those interests are
based on a legal right. Small groups within larger societies,
such as Alaska Natives, typically emphasize this approach
because they know that they will not necessarily win a
majority decision. NDA has difficulty dealing with such
thresholds, as it must add another factor to the analysis
beyond importance, impact, and uncertainty. CDA can deal
with it more easily. Taken together, these problems mean that
NDA may disfavor smaller groups with lower numerical
skills who must argue from a position of rights.
Communication
Both methods may be considered improvements over the
often confounded discussions surrounding oil and gas devel-
opment in the Arctic. Simply achieving greater clarity and
reducing complexity do, to some extent, provide improved
communication. Decisions are more transparent. The NDA
approach can present its findings in more graphically inter-
esting forms because of its numerical base. The research did
not specifically attempt to measure improvements in commu-
nication, but other regulators who work with the CoE indi-
cated that the analyses were improvements.
Ability to Reuse
As the American permitting case showed, the NDA
approach can be applied to a class of decisions. The
American researchers’ tentative conclusion was that some
variant of the NDA approach would be useful to regulators
as a required format for industry-submitted construction
applications or as a format for regulators to follow in
making and explaining their own permitting decisions.
(This conclusion needs to be tested in the context of a
regulatory regime, but such testing was outside the scope
of this study.) Because a chief characteristic of the CDA
approach is that it reduces the number of criteria consid-
ered, it is less generalizable. That is, it must approach each
decision anew and adapt its analysis accordingly.
Ease of Use
The CDA approach is easier to use because it employs
natural language. The NDA required some learning on the
part of the decision makers. Setting the scale (the meaning of
the “100” impact) took considerable discussion, and making
a judgement along that scale did not come naturally. These
difficulties were encountered with decision makers who had
a scientific background and were comfortable with numbers.
One might well ask whether the difficulties might be even
greater for people without this kind of background. With the
rural villages of Alaska becoming more involved in impor-
tant decision making, the analysis method used should be
accessible to people less experienced with numbers. Thus,
CDA may be most appropriate where a decision analyst does
not have much time to work with the decision maker. NDA
may be easier to work with as the length of time available
increases.
Uncertainty
The approaches deal with uncertainty in very different
ways. The CDA approach, in the Yamal case, looks at the cost
of reducing uncertainty. That is, the qualitative approach
translates uncertainty into a monetary figure. Even if decision
makers decide not to pay that cost, it is not an unknown. A
public debate can be pursued in which the value of uncer-
tainty carries a concrete figure.
The NDA approach may attempt to estimate the amount of
uncertainty. Here again the decision maker has to be able to
think in quantitative terms to provide an estimate. The payoff
is that the analysis can derive a single estimate of uncertainty
to go with the single estimate of utility. Again, the uncertainty
can be graphically presented. The public debate entrained by
this treatment of uncertainty would cover the estimates given
by the decision maker.
In both cases, the response might be to spend money on
research to reduce the uncertainty. Under the CDA approach,
a permit applicant or a decision maker will have a clear idea
as to the opportunity cost of not doing the research. That is,
the analysis can suggest that further research might be justi-
fied by cost reduction from not having to provide an engineer-
ing solution to the problem. If, for instance, a model could be
developed to predict accurately the entrance of icebergs into
Baydaratskaya Bay, with the result that a ship need be
stationed in the bay only during those times, the value of the
research and the maximum suggested cost would be equal to
the cost reduction from periodic rather than constant monitor-
ing. The NDA approach does not give a dollar cost in the same
way. It does point out more clearly, however, where the issues
lie. As uncertainty makes an impact less desirable, an incen-
tive exists to improve the precision of figures given.
Institutional Acceptance of the Methodologies
Initially, CoE decision makers appeared more comfort-
able with CDA, but they became more accepting of NDA as
they used it. The CoE has not taken the step of using either
method as a formal part of its permit application procedure.
This step would probably require review at levels higher than
the Alaska District Office Regulatory Branch.
Two instances of nonacceptance did arise, however,
during the course of research. In both cases, the people failed
to understand that the analysis techniques were not intended
as objective analyses which would support the decision
makers’ own knowledge and thinking. Nor do the methods
magically transform the decision makers’ decision into some-
thing more robust than it already is. The methods do make
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subjective decisions more understandable to others and, in
this respect, make the decisions more public, if not more
objective.
CONCLUSIONS
Decision analysis methods differ in how they address
Arctic oil and gas issues. These differences suggest that such
methods can improve oil and gas decision making, rendering
it clearer both to the public and to the decision maker. Arctic
resource decisions are public and do need better public
understanding. These methods therefore suggest that im-
proved decision analytic methods are an important research
objective.
Arguably, Arctic resource decisions are among the most
thorny environmental issues because of their complexity and
uncertainty. Methods developed for the Arctic may therefore
serve well elsewhere. They may also be applied to several
areas that are not strictly environmental issues, such as
allocating basic scientific research funds. Arctic oil and gas
decision makers must think not just about their decisions, but
about how their decision making might be clarified and
communicated.
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